Historically, the '30-day observation', as it is colloquially known in forensic mental health parlance, has been conducted in secure forensic units within specialized mental health facilities, of which there are not many in the country. The limited numbers of these facilities and specialist personnel have, for decades, resulted in rather long waiting lists for accused persons ordered to undergo such evaluations. The examinations usually include one or both of section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, meaning that the court may be questioning the individual's competency to stand trial, and/or the person's criminal responsibility. The former requires an examination of the accused's current mental state as well as an assessment of his or her understanding of court processes, ability to plead and instruct defence counsel, among other competencies, while the latter entails a retrospective assessment of mental processes at and around the time of the alleged offence.
Although the day-visit approach to sections 77 and 78 examinations is not commonly used, it is by no means new and has been employed in parts of the country for some time. Of course, the Pistorius ruling is somewhat unusual in that the court had specifically ordered a day-visit format for the evaluation, unlike virtually all other cases in the country where a '30-day observation' in terms of section 77 and/or 78 is ordered without the day-visit format stipulation.
In the Limpopo province of South Africa, in the context of scarce mental health resources, Weiss (2013) noted that for several years, large numbers of cases have been assessed using the dayvisit approach, with acceptable outcomes. However, the approach does not appear to be generally favoured, and in view of this and other factors, there is a considerable waiting list nationally, for the relevant examinations.
There are two crucial reasons, among others, for the lengthy waiting lists for these examinations, namely, (1) insufficient bed space in mental health facilities and (2) a shortage of forensic mental health personnel. The latter is of significance because the legislation requires two or three psychiatrists on the examination panel, and possibly one clinical psychologist at the discretion of the court (Republic of South Africa, 2008) . South Africa has very few psychiatrists and even fewer focusing on forensic mental health work. Neither of these problems looks to be rectified in the near future. The fact that the law allows for the appointment of a clinical psychologist onto the panel means that it is beyond doubt that it recognizes the clinical psychologist's competence to perform such examinations.
Viewed in this context, Judge Masipa's ruling on the examination format is welcomed. It is considered both progressive and sensitive to the challenges as well as the capabilities of the country's forensic mental health system. Very importantly, the ruling demonstrates recognition of the fact that such examinations can be conducted quite effectively without an accused person having to be detained in hospital, an argument that has been made previously (Pillay, 2014) . Decisions of this nature, which challenge the status quo, demonstrate cognizance of the systemic problems, and break new ground, are to be encouraged.
Certainly not all cases requiring section 77 or 78 examinations will lend themselves to day-visit examinations, but there is reason to believe that most accused persons can be evaluated in the manner afforded to Oscar Pistorius. That this process is also used elsewhere in the country and accepted by the courts (Weiss, 2013 ) is further evidence of its usefulness and reliability. Against this background, blanket arguments against day-visit approaches come to naught, since all of the relevant aspects of the required examinations can be achieved during the day-visits. These include interviews with the accused, history and corroborating interviews with significant others, psychometric and other tests that may be necessary, and reports from multidisciplinary team members on observations of the accused person's general and interpersonal behaviour. Moreover, hardly ever is an entire 30-day period required for such examinations -in fact, many cases can be completed in just a few days.
Pillay

379
Also of significance in the Pistorius ruling was the appointment of a clinical psychologist onto the panel. Section 79(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 makes provision for such an appointment, but disappointingly, courts seldom make these appointments. There are also no set guidelines or criteria to determine when clinical psychologists should be appointed, other than 'where the court so directs'. Considering the types and nature of crimes tried in South African courts, it is difficult to understand why such appointments are not routine. More importantly, of course, clinical psychologists possess the competencies to conduct such evaluations, as recognized by the law (Republic of South Africa, 2008).
Appointing clinical psychologists more frequently onto the section 77/78 examining panels will serve to affirm the legal statutes and, more importantly, the idea behind the inclusion of this professional category in section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Otherwise, one has to wonder about the motive behind including clinical psychologists in this aspect of the legislation, and possibly the genuineness of this inclusion. In other words, was the legislation amended to include clinical psychologists, simply aimed at pacifying the growing discontent expressed by this group at the time? Or was there a distinct recognition of the role that clinical psychologists can play in section 77 and 78 examinations?
Given the fact that clinical psychologists are trained and licensed not only to understand and diagnose mental disorders but that their training is grounded in many years of study of the intricacies and complexities of human development, emotion, and behaviour, as well as interpersonal interactions and conflicts, it should be clear that they have significant contributions to make to judicial deliberations regarding human behaviours, emotions, and thought processes in serious crimes. In South Africa, virtually all of the major mental health complexes are equipped to train clinical psychologists in forensic mental health evaluations, and most incorporate this component into the training programme, considering the training regulations require that 10% of the internship should focus on forensic psychology (Health Professions Council of South Africa, 2009).
There is a need for amendment of the legislation to include the routine appointment of clinical psychologists onto the examining panel, rather than the current provision which might appear somewhat placatory considering its infrequency of application. This would be in the interest of efficient justice, reducing the waiting list for section 77 and 78 examinations, understanding and recognizing the skills sets of mental health professionals, and demonstrating the effective utilization of the national resources. As the country grows and matures through its democracy, progressive and responsive legislation is needed, like in some parts of the world where clinical psychologists are not only routinely appointed onto the evaluation panel but can even constitute the majority (Gowensmith, Murrie, & Boccaccini, 2012) . Considering there are almost four times as many clinical psychologists than psychiatrists in the country, this is more than just food for thought -it is imperative that law reforms take cognizance of resource availability, professional competencies, the possibility of influencing swifter justice, and maximizing the utilization of available resources in a country that is essentially resource-constrained.
Considering there are alternatives, the lengthy waiting list for section 77 and 78 examinations also has substantial human rights implications, first for survivors of criminal acts, victims, and their families. Martin Luther King's (1963) contention that 'justice too long delayed is justice denied', possibly a paraphrase of William Gladstone's earlier lament, must surely come to mind. Second, for awaiting trial prisoners and those on bail, their quest for a fair trial is deferred, sometimes for lengthy periods, until a hospital bed is available. It is somewhat surprising that this issue has not previously been challenged within the human rights context. Of course, the Pistorius ruling ordering a day-visit approach to the criminal responsibility examination, effected at relatively short notice, does set a welcome precedent. As a result, we have to wonder whether we are likely to see future court actions challenging the delayed judicial process when an accused person is given a number on a lengthy waiting list for a bed in one of the major forensic mental health facilities. The alternative of a day-visit assessment has to be beyond question, when viewed in this context. After all, if it could be done for Pistorius, there is no plausible reason why day-visit examinations cannot be allowed for other accused persons -or are there?
There is no question that the day-visit approach to forensic mental health evaluation should be used more often. It is time-saving, cost saving, efficient and, in most cases there is not much clinical value to be gained from watching an accused person sleep!
